About the speaker
R. James Woolsey is a Venture Partner with Lux Capital Management. He also Chairs the Board of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Mr. Woolsey previously served in the U.S. Government on five different occasions, where he held Presidential appointments in two Republican and two Democratic administrations, most recently (1993-95) as Director of Central Intelligence.
During his 12 years of government service, in addition to heading the CIA and the Intelligence Community, Mr. Woolsey was Ambassador to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Vienna, 1989-1991.
R. James Woolsey:
I’ll fit in questions and answers at the end if you all want but I’m going to deal with one right now because it always gets asked and if you’ve heard me tell this story before as my father used to say, “Please, don’t interrupt me. I love it too much.”
It happened because in the fall of my first year at the agency as Director my Stanford reunion, my 30th Stanford reunion came up. And so I mentioned in my morning meeting with my staff that in 2 or 3 weeks I was going to take a couple three days off and fly to California for my Stanford reunion and my head of security, Buck, who was about 6’8’’, 290 [pounds]… something like that, came up afterwards and said, “Mr. Director, I just wanted to let you know that if Mrs. Woolsey goes, she’s going to have to be on a different plane because we can’t have anybody named Woolsey on your plane.” I said, “What do you mean? My name is Woolsey.” He said, “Oh, no sir. You need to fly an alias.” And, of course, my first thought was, “Oh, there go the frequent flyer miles.”
So I up to the airport. We put my wife on a flight for… They find a separate flight and then I go on a separate flight ushered on by these two big security guys and they stop by the cockpit. They show the pilot, the chief flight attendant they’re carrying weapons [and] that they’re authorized to by the federal government. We pass through…given that it’s McLean, I should probably explain. There’s a section of the airplane behind First Class. It’s called Coach. We went through First Class, actually Business, back to the back of Coach and there are the three seats right in front of the John that you can’t even lean back because- And I was in the middle of these and with a 290 pound guy on one and a 300 pound guy on the other, spread out. We fly to California for six hours or something.
So we’re getting off and walking down the jetway and I- The flight attendant came over and whispered something to my head of security. And Buck just cracked up. Now, I had not seen 280-90 pound Buck even smile in the eight months he had been my head of security. But he just cracked up. I kind of drifted over toward him as we were walking down the jet way I said, “What’s so funny?” He said, “You know what she said? …She said I’ve been on these flights now for nearly 20 years and that is the politest and best behaved prisoner that we have ever had.” So look at it this way, I can say accurately that as Director I participated in a covert operation. I got to California under cover. Operation brought off. That’s not made up. I could not have made it up.
Well, let me share some thoughts if it’s alright with you on Iran and the situation particularly in that part of the world because it has created as difficult a set of problems for the United States as we’ve had since Pearl Harbor… and maybe even including Pearl Harbor and what happened subsequently.
We have some very serious things to deal with and let me talk about why Iran is a problem. First of all, there’s the ideology and the administration I think is convinced that the ideology is not something hard and fast. That it’s held- a belief held by the leadership in Iran- I think they believe that it is something that can be tuned down as the Soviets belief in Communism was by the 1960s or so late 60s anyway.
Probably there were more true believing Marxist-Leninists in the bookstores of the Upper West Side of Manhattan than there were in the Kremlin. And we wore the Soviets down. Not only did we wear them down with respect to the resources they had to spend, with respect to the superiority of our technology, and their fears about things like the Strategic Defense Initiative. We wore them down I think just in terms of their realizing how thoroughly rotten and ineffective their ideology was. And they with very rare exceptions, were not interested in dying for the principle “From each according to his ability to each according to his need.” They didn’t want to die at all. They wanted to remodel their dachas. So… I think we got used to dealing with an enemy like that. And our managing of that relationship with the Soviets worked, actually, pretty well. We had some real close calls, one of them the Cuban Missile Crisis, another one where things could have gone completely haywire.
But they didn’t in part because we were dealing with a rational opponent who didn’t like us very much but didn’t loathe us from the essence of his being. We’re in a different situation now with Iran. We’re in a situation where the ideological umph that was present in the 1930s and in 50s, probably in the 60s on the Soviet side, the belief… the fanatic belief essentially in destroying us… that has been for at least since 1979, and is still, a core belief for a large proportion of the managing and ruling elite of Iran, including more than the elite, the Revolutionary Guard, equivalent to sort of the SA and the SAS in Hitler’s Germany. We- …except they own a big chunk – which the SA and SAS did not – they own a big chunk of the Iranian economy and manage [the] nuclear program and the rest. And their ideology is the one that drove them into the streets in… fifteen years ago and helped them get in the state of mind in which they tortured, raped, and killed large numbers of young people who were trying to take Iran in a positive direction and save the election from having been stolen like it was by Ahmadinejad.
So the first point is that we are facing in Iran at least in my judgment a very, very, motivated and angry and religiously motivated enemy. When they talk about the Mahdi returning and fighting the battles that end the world, they’re not just kind of mumbling something. Bernard Lewis, who to my mind has been for a long time, our leading scholar on that part of the world, says that during the Cold War mutually assured destruction was a deterrent. Unfortunately, now with Iran it’s an inducement. And the road that Ahmadinejad built form Qom up to Tehran so that the Mahdi would have a nice road to travel on after he came out of the well which he fell into sometime in the 700s is something people built with belief not… “Ah, yeah, we’re going to build this road.” No. We have a very serious problem in the [unintelligible]… especially serious although we’ve done a not too bad job of curtailing their use of funds and slapping sanctions on them that were B+ sanctions. They were pretty good. And we did that more or less effectively.
We have a situation where for some years they were scraping hard for cash in order to get done what they needed, they believe, to have done and now with the Iran Deal, the agreement that President Obama signed and submitted to, they have a- I think a stance which is essentially one of increasing- dramatically increasing wealth. They will get something between $100 and $150 billion with a B dollars from the lifting of the sanctions which the president has decided… The requirements have been met and therefore it can proceed. [I’ll] answer questions if you want about why I think the sanctions have not been lifted by the Iranians or anybody else’s behavior and why I think the agreement is not only rotten in substance but procedurely not yet begun. But nonetheless it is being treated that way and we are freeing up funds and we will soon have not just an enemy that loathes us with every ounce of his being but one who does so and has a nice load of $100-150 billion dollars to spend on various terrorist activities. The administration the other day, the State Department, decided they were not going to label the Revolutionary Guard a terrorist organization because… it was very hard to pick at exactly why. That has some very serious consequences centered around but not exclusively Iran’s work on nuclear weapons. Iran is marvelously endowed with oil and gas. In order to believe that they really want nuclear power in order to generate electricity, you have to be among the most naive participants in the public debate discussion. But they are pushing very hard on their work, on their centrifuges, on the heavy water reactor, on really all other steps that are needed to move them toward having a nuclear weapon.
I had someone whose judgement I trust although he did not claim to be absolutely sure of what I’m about to say. [He told me] a month or so ago that Iran probably already had developed a nuclear weapon and was moving it around up in the northern desert which- on armored vehicles not keeping it at a single location, which could be learned and perhaps hit by an American airstrike or Israeli. So we don’t know I don’t think for sure but they either have or are very, very close to having a nuclear weapon and the theoretical limits that are imposed by the agreement, which might mean that they are a year or a year and three months or something away from having a nuclear weapon, I think is extremely cautious estimate. I think the chances are reasonably good they have one and better than reasonably good that even- That if they don’t, [they will have a nuclear weapon] very, very soon.
That creates a whole host of problems for us because our colleagues, sometimes they’re friends, sometimes they’re not friends, sometimes they’re allies, sometimes not, but let’s call for examples the Saudis ‘our colleagues’ in dealing with Iran. A number of our colleagues in that part of the world, Jordan, Egypt, et cetera have decided based on the nuclear agreement that we signed that the United States has given up on its role of taking a firm stand and basically being a leader of the non-Iran faction of disputes and arguments and disagreements and even battles in the Middle East and that we are basically giving up. It’s difficult to challenge based on the evidence [for] that conclusion and that state of mind that is being pursued I think in the capitals of Amman and Cairo and so on is one that makes it very likely that within a very few years we will have at least 2 or 3 and more likely 4 or 5 more nuclear powers in the Middle East.
Now we had a couple confrontations with the Soviets; one in which they had a new submarine weapon, a nuclear torpedo, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and we didn’t know about it and they had two submarines outfitted with these nuclear torpedos. And when we imposed our blockade essentially and started depth bombing the Soviet submarines in order to scare them to the surface, it worked with all but one and their communications were down, their cooling systems were down, they were all frying down there and getting angrier and angrier.
There was a skipper, a commander of the two submarines together, a skipper for each one, and a party boss. Each of those four people had a key and if the- all those keys got turned, the nuclear torpedo would have been launched at American ship[s] and there would have been a nuclear detonation. And three of those four men turned their key. One did not. The skipper of the boat that had the weapon on it refused to turn the key, and in a situation in which – the Middle East, we have Iranians and Lebanese and Yemenis and Turks and Egyptians and Sunni v. Shiia and so forth, and add a major crisis in the Middle East. Is anyone going to be as sensible and as balanced and as cool under fire as that bless him that Soviet skipper from that submarine in 1962? I somewhat doubt it.
So we have the proliferation problem that has been heavily augmented by, I think, the nuclear agreement and we also have another problem, which is very difficult to deal with. We can deal with it but it is, to put it mildly, a matter of some urgency and serious importance. Back in 1962 when the Nuclear Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty came into effect, in the months preceding the coming into effect [of] the treaty both the United States and the Soviet Union conducted some atmospheric tests and detonated, including extra atmospheric in a sense, including 20, 30, 40 kilometers up in space detonation of nuclear weapons on satellites.
By the way, that’s not particularly hard to do. One of the reasons that the first thing both the Soviets and the Americans did in space was to put something basketball-sized into orbit is that that’s easy to do. You don’t have to have re-entry. You don’t have to have accuracy. You don’t have to have a lot of the things you need if you’re going to fire an ICBM at somebody halfway around the world. If all you’re trying to do is put something into orbit, it’s not that difficult. Well, both the Soviets and the Americans were surprised at how far away, thousands of miles in some cases, the electronics, even the primitive electronics of the time, were fried essentially by the nuclear detonation.