The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Is There a Way Out?
(Dr. Stephen Bryen, February 6, 2023)
Transcript available below
About the speaker
Dr. Stephen Bryen is a leading expert in security strategy and technology. He has held senior positions in the Department of Defense, on Capitol Hill and as the President of a large multinational defense and technology company. Currently, Dr. Bryen is a Senior Fellow at the American Center for Democracy, the Center for Security Policy.
He has served as a senior staff director of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as the Executive Director of a grassroots political organization, as the head of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy, and as the founder and first director of the Defense Technology Security Administration. He is the author of Technology Security and National Power: Winners and Losers, and of three volumes of Essays in Technology, Security and Strategy. Dr. Bryen was twice awarded the Defense Department’s highest civilian honor, the Distinguished Service Medal.
Transcript
Introduction
Robert R. Reilly:
Hello and welcome to the Westminster Institute. I am Robert Reilly, its director. Today I am particularly pleased to welcome back to the Westminster Institute Dr. Stephen Bryen, with whom we have already done a number of shows, some on technology, some on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which will be our subject today.
But first I have some background on our speaker. He is a leading expert in security strategy and technology. He has held senior positions in the Department of Defense, on Capitol Hill and as President of a large multinational defense and technology company. Currently, Dr. Bryen is a Senior Fellow at the American Center for Democracy at the Center for Security Policy.
He has served as a senior staff director of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as the Executive Director of a grassroots political organization, as the head of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy, and as the founder and first director of the Defense Technology Security Administration. Dr. Bryen is the author of five books, including Technology Security and National Power: Winners and Losers, and of three volumes of Essays in Technology, Security and Strategy. Dr. Bryen was twice awarded the Defense Department’s highest civilian honor, the Distinguished Service Medal.
He is joining us today to discuss: “The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Is There a Way Out?” Dr. Bryen, welcome back to the program.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Thank you. It is nice to be with you.
The Big Picture
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, let us do a big picture scene setter of this topic. The so-called realist school claims that NATO and the United States trespassed on an area of vital national security of Russia, that being Ukraine, which for most of its existence has been under either part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union or at least beholden to Russia, and that the war was precipitated by the insistence on the part of the United States and NATO that Ukraine could become a member and indeed should become a member.
Now, another side says no, that is not the problem. The problem is a contest between autocracy and democracy, so the stakes in this conflict are not local to that part of the world but in fact effect the entire world. And should Russia, unprovoked, invade a neighboring country that is independent and free, and impose its will by force of arms, and succeed in doing this, this simply offer the example to China to take Taiwan in a similar way, and to other autocrats to behave in such a way. So the stakes are really larger, they are global. In fact, in a way everything is at stake.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
That is true.
Robert R. Reilly:
Do you want to comment on that?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, you know, I think you could say it is both things, actually. The fact is the Russians regard Ukraine as their backyard. They regard it as strategic because it has access to the Black Sea. It had in Crimea a major naval port, Sevastopol, which was quite crucial to the Russians and to the Ukrainians. It is a big breadbasket for the world. It has always been a breadbasket.
But it also has a large Russian-speaking population, and that is found primarily along the eastern side of the country and to the south. The struggle between the Ukrainian government and Russian speakers has been intense. People do not like to talk about that these days, but it was intense. It still is intense, and it is partly Russian speaking, it is partly religious.
Now there is a crackdown by the Ukrainian authorities on the Russian Orthodox church, a very nasty crackdown where priests are being arrested and where reportedly – and I do not know if this is true or not, but it is reported that the Ukrainians have actually setup snipers to pick off Orthodox priests supporting the Russian troops, using snipers to kill them.
Robert R. Reilly:
How credible is that?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I do not know. I honestly do not know, but it is not coming from Russian sources so it may be true. But it is certainly true that the Ukrainian government has been arresting priests, shutting down some of the Russian Orthodox churches. So basically, it is not only a war of ethnicity and language, but it is also a war of religion, so you have that kind of thing mixed in. It is not a happy thing.
The second point is that Ukraine is barely a democracy. I mean, it had elections, Zelenskyy was elected, but all of the opposition was arrested, so there is not any effective opposition in Ukraine today. Either they are arrested, or they have had to leave the country and they are operating elsewhere.
Robert R. Reilly:
If I may interrupt, Dr. Bryen, how much of that is simply due to the fact that it is a country at war?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, but it happened before it was at war. I mean, the other part of the problem – this is what makes the whole mixture very complicated is the fact – and I think this is the thing that propelled the Russians into making the rather unfortunate decision to invade Ukraine – was the buildup of Ukrainian forces by NATO, and particularly by the United States, over eight or nine years, where the Russians thought that this was not only going to become a NATO-aligned country but it was going to be a military power aimed at Russia’s underbelly. And this is something they did not find acceptable. So from their point of view, the war was justified on that basis.
And that is where we are. Where we are now is the two, new so-called republics, Luhansk and Donetsk, and then the southern corridor to Crimea, are sort of what are known as the Russian objectives in this war. I think their objectives have changed from that to something more, but at least officially that is what the Russians say.
My own opinion is that the Russians want a friendly government in Kiev, they do not want an unfriendly government, and if that means essentially toppling the existing government, then they are prepared to do it. So I do not know if that answers your question, but that is how I see it.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, that certainly gives a range. The current situation is that both sides are expecting a major offensive. The Ukrainians now claim that Russia has twice as many troops in eastern Ukraine as they used in the initial invasion, so some three hundred thousand troops, and they are probing all along the line, the length of some 140 or more miles in the Donetsk region, trying to find the weak spots. And the Ukrainians are expecting a major initiative from the Russians.
They simply do not know exactly where it is going to come. It makes life difficult for them, and this has accelerated President Zelenskyy’s requests for more weapons, for tanks, for long range missiles, etc. because of this stepped-up Russian effort.
Now, Russia got its nose good and bloodied in the initial invasion, which exhibited all kinds of shortcomings and incompetencies on the part of the Russian military. They took heavy casualties. They did not achieve all of their objectives. And Ukraine then had the opportunity to go on the offensive itself and take back some of the properties that Russia had initially succeeded in taking.
Now, how would you gauge the respective sides as they face each other today? I mean, many people have called this a World War I style trench warfare.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
It is more World War II style. Artillery is a big piece of it. It is an artillery war at the moment, pretty much.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, that is Russia’s kind of war, no?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Exactly. It is exactly the kind of war where they have significant advantages over Ukraine.
You are quite right. They did very badly in the beginning, the Russians. Their commanders were not good. They did not realize the nature of the problem they faced or the tenacity of the Ukrainians. I think they misjudged that very badly. Their lack of organization, the lack of proper use of equipment, especially armor, all were exploited heavily by the Ukrainians, and successfully for a while.
But I think where we are now is, first of all, the Russians have gotten better at what they do. You know, they have improved the quality of their warfare, and their leadership is better. In terms of numbers, the Russians certainly are much stronger than the Ukrainians. And even in a war of attrition, which I do not think it is at the moment, but if it was just that, over time it is going to wear down Ukraine. They cannot sustain it. They just do not have the manpower or the equipment or even an economy to support it all, so they are in somewhat dire condition, I think, right now. That is my opinion.
I think a lot of the assessments that we have been getting, mostly from Ukrainian sources, have been highly optimistic and really have not told us enough about the current situation. The Ukrainians are taking very heavy losses. So are the Russians, but the Russians can afford to take higher losses than Ukraine.
And there is the question of replacement. It is very difficult for Ukraine to replace manpower, and equipment as well, so it is getting to be one of those situations where I think we are ending up at a dangerous moment because I think the United States does not want to see, and NATO certainly does not want to see, the Ukrainian resistance collapse, but I think there is a risk that it would, a serious risk.
And you know, one of the things that worries me a great deal is that there does not seem to be any objective Intelligence on the Western side as to what the real situation is. The closest we have come was General Milley, who is the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when General Milley said, you know, the casualties on both sides are about equal.
Robert R. Reilly:
A hundred thousand?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, or more, but it was not so much the number [than] that the casualties were about equal, [which] says that Ukraine cannot sustain that. I think he made that clear. He also said that there is no chance that Ukraine is going to take back the territory that the Russians have [taken] this year, so we have almost the entire year in front of us and he says that is not going to happen. So I think that sent a message or a strong message inside the administration, but the administration so far has not figured out what to do.
Robert R. Reilly:
Why are you saying it is not yet a war of attrition?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Because the Russians are making advances. The war of attrition is kind of where you have a stable front, sort of like what happened in Israel in ’71 when they had a war of attrition before the big war started, and they were firing rockets and artillery at each other, but nothing moved. But things are moving right now in Ukraine.
Robert R. Reilly:
Around Bakhmut?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Bakhmut is one of the places. It is not the only one, but I think Bakhmut is the most sensitive one. The Ukrainians have tried to do a diversion down by Kherson to try and draw off some of the Russian forces, but they have not been successful at it. And if Bakhmut falls, it has not yet but it is getting closer and closer, then Ukraine loses its supply lines back to the front, and then they are in trouble. That gives the Russians a chance to cross the Dnieper River and to move into central Ukraine, so that is a very sensitive part of the battle. But there are battles in Zaporizhzhia. There are battles in Kherson. There are other battles in the north, Luhansk, going on, so it is not just one place. But I think Bakhmut is the most sensitive.
Robert R. Reilly:
How essential do you suppose these requests for more weapons are for Ukraine’s success or survival? Ukraine seems to have been highly successful in a maneuver war.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
In the beginning.
Robert R. Reilly:
In the beginning, and Russia showed significant failures in that area, and they, of course, took large losses. I was reminded in a way of what happened in World War II after the German invasion in ’41. The Soviets took what for any other country would be considered catastrophic losses, yet they did learn from those losses, and they rearmed, and went on the offensive. And they went on the offensive with what one could almost describe as mass human wave attacks against German positions.
They took enormous personnel losses in fighting that way. There were commissars behind the front line with pistols to execute any Soviet soldier who decided that he did not want to die that day. Basically, they would do this until the Germans ran out of ammunition. And then, of course, their leadership at the general officer level improved greatly, and they began to maneuver against the Germans successfully.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I think that is the key parallel.
Robert R. Reilly:
Yeah, so I mean, what that demonstrated is Russia’s ability to sustain large losses, their ability to learn from their failures and to successfully come back. Now, that, of course, was the Soviet Union, which was a larger country than Russia is today.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, they did not have Eastern Europe then, so it was not that much bigger than it is now.
Robert R. Reilly:
Okay, so where does that parallel apply and where does it not? It would seem to certainly be an optimistic appraisal of what Russia might achieve.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, look, I mean, what we are seeing is a switch by the Russians to a war using a lot of artillery to try and soften up and destroy the resources of the Ukrainian military, and then send troops into specific villages and towns to clean them out. And that seems to be the nature of the warfare that is going on right now. I do not think it is going to change very much. The Russians now appear to have air superiority, which they did not in the beginning. They have degraded a lot of Ukraine’s air defenses, and also some of its high-class weapons, so yeah. I mean, that is what we are going to see more of.
The question is, and I do not have an answer to this, what are the Russians planning next? I mean, they have many options. They could keep the push going at Bakhmut and try to overrun the Ukrainians and force them to move whatever reserves they have up toward that battle, and have a big battle, you know, Stalingrad style, if you want, and that may be their strategy, or they could decide to make a run for Kiev. I do not think they can do that right now, but they may. They have got a big spare force ready to go into the fight.
Look, I do not see how the Ukrainians can win it or stabilize it. I just do not see it, and a lot of military experts agree with that assessment and said, you know, the only hope right now is to try and reach some kind of political deal with the Russians that is acceptable to everybody, if it is possible.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, it is interesting that the Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, made a remark the other day that Russia would be open to a serious proposal from the United States to resolve the conflict, but that all they have heard is a message delivered from Blinken that Russia should withdraw, which is not, of course, a negotiation proposal, so it appears that both sides think that they might succeed and therefore they would try to push their advantages until they have strengthened their positions, and therefore will be in a stronger position to negotiate.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Yeah, I mean, that is true as long as you do not lose.
Robert R. Reilly:
That is the risk.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
That is the risk, and the risk is growing. Do we want to wait for the offensive to come and see what happens? Because I am not sure there will be time, honestly, to try and sort it out. You know, if that offensive looks like it is going to topple the Ukrainian government, I just do not see it, so I think, realistically speaking, it would be better at least on some back channel, if not openly, to negotiate.
Now, the difficulty here is that the U.S. has been a big holdout about negotiations all along, going back to before 2014 when the Europeans tried to broker a deal, and did broker a deal, called the Minsk Agreement, the first one in 2014 and the second one in 2015. The U.S said we were not going to participate in that and refused and have consistently refused ever since. And of course, NATO now has the same official position, which is rather odd because it is not the position of Germany or France. But even so, there is an incongruity between what NATO says and what Germany and France say, which is rather bizarre.
The U.S. has refused negotiations, does not want to have negotiations, [and] did not want to support the Minsk agreements. I thought there were elements of the Minsk agreements which were not unfavorable to Ukraine. You know, if I recall correctly, the Minsk agreements said that there could be autonomous areas inside Ukraine but still under Ukrainian law, still with parliamentary representation in the Ukrainian Parliament, but with a modicum of independence, which was to take care of the Russian-speaking population.
The Russians were prepared to accept it, that was good enough for them, not good enough for the Ukrainians and not good enough for the United States, and we have been stuck on that problem ever since. Nowadays the Russians say, you know, the only people we will negotiate with at this stage of the game is the United States, because they are the power behind the throne, they are what is making this war happen, and if Washington does not want to negotiate, then there is no negotiation. If Washington does want to negotiate, we are open to it.
The Russians constantly said they were willing to talk, so you cannot say they refused. They have not refused. It is the U.S. that has refused. It is very unusual for the United States to completely refuse a political dialogue.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, I mean, it is certainly fair to say that without the support of the United States, Ukraine could not fight this war.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
For sure.
Robert R. Reilly:
The thing is how long can it continue to fight the war with the ruined economy, serious losses of manpower and personnel, leading to the constant pleas from President Zelenskyy for upgrades in weapons, particularly in tanks and long-range missiles?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
And airplanes now. He wants F-16s.
Robert R. Reilly:
He wants F-16s. And their foreign minister asked in a tweet the other day, please send us one of the German submarines for the Black Sea. Now, whether he was joking or serious, nobody knows, but how fast may things move? We know that President Biden was reluctant to agree to send the Abrams tanks to Ukraine.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, the U.S. was not planning to send any Abrams tanks at all. What happened was very straightforward. We pressured the Germans to send the Leopard tanks, the German said no. We pressured them some more. The Germans said no. Then the German said look, you are not sending Abrams. If you send Abrams, then we will send Leopards, but otherwise we are not sending them, so they essentially forced Washington into deciding to send Abrams.
And now it has become very complicated because we do not have any to send. We cannot take U.S tanks out of inventory and send them because they have the special armor which is vital to our armored forces, and we are not going to share that with anybody. And we certainly do not want the Russians to get their hands on any of those, so we have to take tanks that we have, strip them out, rebuild them with the proper armor that is acceptable, and with degraded systems because we are not going to put our best systems in them, and then ship them to Ukraine. So we are over four or five months, maybe six months away.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, and then having been an armor office myself, it is a distant memory but the armor officer basic school was about three months to learn how to operate those tanks and how to use them.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
But that is where you had an infrastructure in place.
Robert R. Reilly:
There was. It was at that point at Fort Knox. So the tanks have to be built, and the Ukrainians have to be used to operate them. That is not a simple thing, and particularly when you get to the level of sophistication that is present in the Abrams tanks. Then you have to have the support infrastructure and repair facilities.
This is a tank, as you well know, that uses jet fuel. It does not use diesel, so you need a completely different supply line to keep those tanks in the field. As you also know, they are very heavy tanks.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
They are over 60 tons.
Robert R. Reilly:
So to operate off-road or in a sloshy spring in Ukraine would be [difficult].
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, and I am told that some of the bridges just will not support them. It is too heavy.
Robert R. Reilly:
But they can get the Leopard tanks much more quickly. Poland now has German permission to convey their Leopards to Ukraine, so those are weapons in the field. The Ukrainians have to be trained how to use them. All told, I think that we are talking about over 100 tanks conveyed to Ukraine.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I do not know if you will see that many.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, maybe not, but how big a difference will that make for Ukraine? The tank is an offensive weapon.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, of course, it depends how they are used, and how close up they get to the Russian forces, because the Russians have anti-tank weapons, quite good ones. The Leopards, we know, are highly vulnerable to Russian anti-tank weapons. We already saw that in Syria, where around ten or more were destroyed by ISIS, not by any real army but by ISIS holding Russian anti-tank weapons, so they are vulnerable tanks. So are Russian tanks. Even the Abrams is to a degree vulnerable because most of them do not have any active protection systems, which is the name of the game today, I think.
Robert R. Reilly:
You mean reactive armor?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
No, no, that is a passive system.
Robert R. Reilly:
Oh, I see.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Active protection is a system like the Israeli Trophy, which intercepts an incoming missile and detonates it before it hits the tank, and that is a very slick technology. The Russians claim they have it, but they do not have it on any of their tanks, so either it does not work, or they cannot produce it, or both.
The U.S. has been very slow in adopting Trophy. They have not bought 100 units, more or less, so far, which is a drop in the bucket when you have a few thousand tanks. And I think the U.S. would prefer to have its own anti-tank system, but so far at least none of them have performed up to the level of the Trophy.
The Trophy is an evolving system anyway. It keeps being improved. So without active protection on a tank today, I think a tank is vulnerable to anti-tank weapons and also to overhead attack, let us say attack by aircraft or helicopters, gunships with armor piercing rounds, because the soft part of the tank is the top, the turret, and the hard part or the strong part of the tank is the frontal armor. The next vulnerable part are the sides. This is how it is done. So the tank is not a perfect weapon. Its advantage is it moves, and it has a big gun, and that is a key advantage.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, President Zelenskyy is also very anxious to get long-range missiles. They were successful with the HIMARS because the Soviet weapons depots were within reach of the range of the HIMARS with which we supplied Ukraine. The Russians, however, have learned from their losses, and they have moved their supply depots out of the range of the HIMARS, from what I understand.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
That is right.
Robert R. Reilly:
Thus, the urgent requests from Zelenskyy for longer range missiles that can hit those supply depots. Because if [Ukraine] cannot do that, [hit those supply depots], then they are in real trouble.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, then you are attacking inside Russian territory a long way, and that raises a very dramatic question, which is if that happens, will the Russians say, you know, that has gone far enough, we will start taking out the sources of supply in Eastern Europe and in Central Europe that are making our lives difficult. So that means they could attack Poland, they could attack Germany, they could attack Romania. There are a lot of options.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, then they would have the consequence of a war with NATO.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
That is right. Well, they think they are at war with NATO anyway.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, they do. I mean, they are very clear in saying that we are at war with them.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, and you have politicians in Europe saying we are at war with Russia. You know, sometimes it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. You get what you get.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, the Russians have been clear enough in repeatedly saying that they have red lines, just as they said repeatedly for years [that] they had red lines regarding the possibility of Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Those were repeatedly brushed off. And then finally, Russia decided to make its move. Now they are saying red lines exist in terms of the provision of these high-tech weapons to the Ukrainians. And again, as you said, they say that we are already at war with them.
Now, President Biden, in a curious formulation I am paraphrasing, said he ‘instructed that the war not be widened,’ whatever that means. But it is something.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Has he told Putin that?
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, Secretary Blinken has repeated this. But on the other hand, yeah, how do you instruct that the war not be widened when you are taking actions that the opposing side in the war has said will lead to the wider war if they are taken? Now, so far Russia has not acted on its threats, but what do you think is the tipping point for them to [act]?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I do not know what the tipping point is. Honestly, though, I have no idea. I think if the Russians felt that that the provision of these weapons would actually shift the war against them, that would be the tipping point. At this point the Russians are winning the war, in my opinion. Not by a lot, but they are winning the war.
Robert R. Reilly:
You would have against you, for instance, General Ben Hodges, the former Commander of U.S army Europe, who continues to be optimistic in terms of the Ukrainian impetus in this war. And the Russians have been in a way permanently set back.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I do not agree with that. They are on their third Army now, the Ukrainians, because of the casualties. That is tremendous losses. You know, it is very hard to get reliable information because we are left with what the Russians say, and what the Ukrainians say, and what Washington says is the same thing the Ukrainians say, so, you know, you have to sort through the noise.
Ask it the other way around. How come the Russians are making gains, slowly, but making gains and pushing the Ukrainians back, slowly, but nonetheless doing so. And the Ukrainians are not making any gains.
Robert R. Reilly:
After having made significant gains in the fall, but the way in which you described the typical Russian way of fighting, which they exhibited throughout their history, is artillery pulverizes the enemy positions, then [the Russians] move in with the infantry. Now frontline Ukrainians around Bakhmut are describing infantry moving earlier, sooner. And as one officer said, they just keep moving, and he is referring to the Wagner forces.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Yeah, well, Wagner is not your normal military operation.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, but the point is that they keep coming, and so that is a little bit of change in Russian strategy in that respect, and at a certain point hoping to overwhelm the Ukrainian positions by using infantry.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
But they are overwhelming them. I mean, one at a time.
Robert R. Reilly:
But no breakthrough yet.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
The thing the Russians are trying to do with Bakhmut is surround it, and they have not done that yet.
Robert R. Reilly:
They are at the north, the east, and the south.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
They are all over the place, but they have not closed the gap. But the gap is narrowing and that seems to be the primary focus of the war right now, and that is before another offensive that everybody is predicting. Of course, we do not know where that offensive will be exactly, or how or what it will be. But the Russians have a large number of soldiers, and as the Russians say, we can mobilize a lot more.
So as I said, my concern is that, you know, I was sent to Vietnam by the Foreign Relations Committee years ago, ’74 and ’75. And in 75′, I was taken up to I Corps, to the northernmost part of South Vietnam at the time. An I Corps commander who was their top general briefed me. He said we have got it under control, nothing is going to happen, we are stronger than they are, you know, blah blah blah. And a month later, he was defeated on the battlefield and the NVA, the North Vietnamese Army, rolled down towards Saigon. And there were one or two more battles, but it was all over but the shouting. So I worry that that is what we could see in Ukraine.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, it was all over but the shouting because the U.S Congress cut off funding.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
But they had plenty of weapons. It was not a question of a lack of supply.
Robert R. Reilly:
We withdrew Air Force support for them. That was the most critical thing because by that time it was a conventional North Vietnamese army attacking South Vietnam that was vulnerable to our Air Force. But we withdrew that support and left [them].
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
We left the Vietnamese with some F-5s and some attack helicopters, some Hueys, but it was not enough. By the way, that is not unlike what you are seeing in Ukraine right now because Ukraine’s Air Force has been all but decimated.
Robert R. Reilly:
But the other parallel is that the Soviets quintupled their support for the North Vietnamese just as the United States withdrew its support for the South Vietnamese.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
That is true, absolutely right.
Robert R. Reilly:
Now, that does not seem to be in the cards here regarding this Ukraine-Russia conflict, that NATO and the United States are doubling down on their support. But what do you think of this, Steve? The fact that these supplies will not be effectively in the field for many months, and in some cases up to at least a year, incentivizes the Russian forces to make that plunge sooner rather than later, before the Ukrainians are equipped and trained on [what we are sending them].
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I absolutely agree. I think we have accelerated their push to try and take as much as they can take now, and we have not tried to engage them. In fact, the other thing I wanted to mention to you, because it bothers me a great deal, is we are putting all these sanctions on Russia and on Russians. The Wagner group is sanctioned, the Russian military leaders are sanctioned, Russian oligarchs are sanctioned, Russian political leaders are sanctioned, you know, blah blah, sort of saying to them, you know, there is no chance we are going to talk to you. You know, we put you on sanctions, so effectively you are cutting off any avenue of dialogue. And yet, I do not understand that. I honestly do not. I think it is foolish.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, speaking of the sanctions, economic reports have come out that the Russian economy contracted only three and a half percent last year, so the devastation that was predicted from the effect of these sanctions has not been felt in a dramatic way yet. Now, whether they might [feel the effects] the longer this war continues is another question.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Actually, the Germans have suffered more economically than the Russians.
Robert R. Reilly:
This also raises the question of ammunition, which plays into who might win a war of attrition, if it does become a war of attrition. Who runs out of ammunition first? Now, there are reports that the United States has been drawing down ammunition supplies from South Korea, from our arms supply depots in Israel, and sending it to Ukraine, and our anti-tank missiles, our other supplies that we have, [too].
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
No, those are backed up a couple of years.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, and also, we know that NATO is not well armed. It has neglected [its defense]. Those countries in Europe have neglected their defense for many years. It is very thin. They do not seem to have the industrial base anymore to rearm, and neither does the United States. Thus, we can only be depleted to a certain point in terms of those weapons and ammunition before we make ourselves highly vulnerable. How soon do you think it is before we have reached that point?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
[That] depends on the category of weapon, of course, and how hard it is to replace. Well, take the Stinger, [for example]. We had reached a point where we decided not to build any more Stingers because we will have a new version in the future and new air defense, so we stopped making them. The production line is gone. The people who know how to make them are gone. The supply chain for the integrated circuits and other sensors and things like that is gone, so we cannot replace them. It is wishful thinking to think that we are going to replace them.Things like 155 howitzer shells we can make, but we do not have any. You know, the industry is not set up for it right now. We have to re-establish all that. We are not on a war footing in this country. Certainly, in Europe they have not been on a war footing since World War II. I mean, they just are not, so it is not the kind of thing you want to [treat casually]. You are taking a lot of risks. You know, you are taking risks in Asia. You are taking risks in Europe, where you are really not prepared for that kind of risk.
Russian industry, also, was sleeping to some extent, but they claim – and I do not know if it is true or not, but they claim they have got it running 24/7 now all the time and that they are producing what they need to produce. And it may be the case, but I cannot prove it, and I do not think anybody else can. They say so.
Robert R. Reilly:
There are certain stories that the higher tech Russian weapons use American components in their production, so unless they have a huge supply backlog of those components, they can certainly run into trouble there.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
They can, but I think the stuff that is mostly in demand from the Russian side are rockets and ammunition, which is not high tech and does not depend so much on those components. Where they have been hurting is things like drones because they do not have the parts anymore, but they got bailed out by the Iranians, who do have the parts. Now, we could prevent that, but we have not done much about it.
Robert R. Reilly:
Yeah, so supposedly they are getting supplies from North Korea as well now.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
But not of drones. North Korea does not have any. If they got them, they got them from China or from Iran. No, there was an argument made that they were getting artillery shells from North Korea. It may be true. It may not be true. I do not know. But I think there was a dip, a moment when the Russian supply dipped pretty low, but I think that they are rebuilding that.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, they say that the artillery barrages from the Russians in recent weeks reached the highest level within – I forget the exact time frame, but many, many months.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Yes, it is really high right now.
Robert R. Reilly:
[It is] very high, so they certainly must have gotten resupply.Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, which tends to tell us one of two things. Either they think they are at the point where they can break through, so they are really pouring it on, so to speak, or it would tell us that in fact they are not worried about reserves, they have it, but both, probably both.
I read the Russian press every day in English, Tass, Sputnik, RT, that was sort of common, and then Twitter stuff because the Russians flood that, too.
Robert R. Reilly:
What are you learning from that?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, the best one is Tass, in terms of detail, and they are providing on a daily basis [claims like] we have knocked off this many artillery units, we got rid of this many counter battery radars, we killed this many Ukrainian soldiers, that kind of thing, and where [battles are occurring], which village, which town, which place. They are providing very detailed information.
Now, it could all be a lie. I have no way to know, but if it is, it is pretty creative. And the Ukrainians are not saying it is not true, so I am taking it for what it is worth. I think the Russians are causing a lot of damage to the Ukrainians.
Robert R. Reilly:
There is really no accurate way for us to judge that.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
No, not without overhead capability.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, that and all and also the tenor of the peoples in Russia in terms of how they are in favor of or opposed to this war against Ukraine, and whether Putin is maintaining his support or whether he is becoming [unpopular].
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, they claim his [popularity is widespread]. Polls have been taken that show him with 80-some percent support, if you believe it.
Robert R. Reilly:
Yeah, well, if you want to believe it.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I do not [believe it]. I mean, it is not a democracy.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, one thing for sure is it is usually not a sign of success or health if you keep changing the general officers who are running the war in Ukraine. The latest move is Putin has put Gerasimov in charge, expecting him to do what the other commanders were incapable of doing, and that is make substantial gains.
Now, is there anything you might know about him that would help us understand how he might change those failures into a success?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
No, the only thing you can tell is how they are fighting the war. You know, like other generals these days he has not fought a war before. You know, this is his first war. I mean, Syria, yeah, but that is not really a war, that is against ISIS, or I guess whoever they are fighting there, small stuff.
We have fought wars. We had Iraq. We had Afghanistan. We move our forces around. We have done, I think, in terms of readiness a much better job than the Russians ever did. In terms of sophistication, we are much better, net-centric warfare, things like that which we are developing the Russians do not even have.
Robert R. Reilly:
And [we do] combined arms warfare.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
And combined arms warfare, we are very good at that. We have very good air power, I think. And then, of course, we have very good intelligence, which is what has helped the Ukrainians, by the way, because we put tremendous amount of intelligence assets at their disposal.
Robert R. Reilly:
Let us talk once again about this escalatory path. The demands from President Zelenskyy are incessant for a very good reason. They are under major threat. Sometimes there is reluctance on the part of the United States, as it was with the Abrams. There is reluctance based on the fact that, as President Biden instructed, he does not want a larger war. Nonetheless, these weapons then are provided after that period of hesitation, and now the campaign from President Zelenskyy is to provide F-16s.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Yeah, well, I do not think that is likely to happen, at least with Ukrainian pilots. I mean, there is a risk that if this thing goes south, that the U.S. will send in the U.S. Air Force.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, that would be a major escalation, would it not?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Yes, that would be a war, a wider war, but I think that is sort of where we are at.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, the United States would do that if the United States thinks that the penalties from Ukraine losing the war would affect our position in Europe and elsewhere, to take that major, major risk.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
But, you know, back in 2014, I wrote an article called Will NATO Fight, Talk or Trade? And my thought then was that we could not, that we are not in good enough shape. I do not have too much [confidence]. I mean, we have made some improvements. Look, this thing, it is not like we have been sitting on our hands. We have made some improvements, but those are incremental improvements, really, not dramatic. And then we are talking about brigades, not armies.
We bought some better weapons, but you know, you have the Baltic countries, which have very minimal capabilities. You have Germany, which has almost no capabilities today. It is a mess. Poland is better than most of them, but who knows how much, and they are in between. By the way, you know, talking about Poland giving up its tanks, it is only going to give them up as quickly as South Korea delivers the new tanks. Well, they have only gotten of them so far, so they are not going to strip out all their tanks right now. That would be irresponsible.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, I share your skepticism as I look at the NATO forces in wonder. As the crisis with Ukraine increased, we flew over, what, I think something like fourteen thousand American troops to sort of reassure the Europeans. But then you look at the other 29 countries in NATO. Can’t they, you know, assemble a force serious enough to take on any potential [adversary]?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
The short answer is no.
Robert R. Reilly:
The answer is no because when you think how long it would take NATO to mobilize a force serious enough to convince the Russians not to make a move, and you have answered that question.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
They cannot mobilize anything. Well, that is essentially what I wrote in 2017.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, you know, but here is the other side of that question, Steve. What else did the Russians have to throw into this? We could say that NATO is weak, but Russia is [also weak].
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Oh, they have not used even a small part of their army.
Robert R. Reilly:
But their army is not there is no trained.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, I do not know. I mean, you know, what we saw in Ukraine was not very trained, it was not very professional, and it was not very well commanded.
Robert R. Reilly:
But they were they were bringing in components of their Far East before they invaded. I was talking to a Russian who was very close to Putin and was his top economic advisor for some years. He kept saying if you can see what the Russians are doing, they are not going to invade. And my counter to him was, well, look, they are moving units from the Far East to the Ukrainian border. They are not going to do that just for a public relations exercise. They are going to move.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
But they were also did not want to weaken their defenses facing Europe when they could pull these disparate units in, so that they were protecting themselves from a vulnerability, I think. Although more recently they put in some of their first-class units. Some of them got chewed up.
Robert R. Reilly:
And that is just fighting Ukraine, not NATO or the Americans?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Yeah, but I think the Ukrainians are maybe far better organized to fight than the Europeans.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, they certainly had more experience fighting by this time since 2014.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
They had more experience. They had a greater desire, higher morale (at least they did), and they were very well trained. I do not think that is the case of Europe, whether it is Germany, or France, or Italy, or anything. Britain almost has no army anymore, you know?
Robert R. Reilly:
Neither does Germany, yeah. Just France has [an army].
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
So what are we talking about?
Robert R. Reilly:
But that that would seem to be kind of a stalemate in this escalatory scenario because it is neither clear Russia has the capability to move westward, nor [is it clear that] NATO has the capability to move eastward, so maybe that is not the way the escalation would happen. Of course, the frightening scenario is tactical nuclear weapons.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Right, but let me ask the fundamental question. What do we need to have NATO in Ukraine for?
Robert R. Reilly:
You mean why do we need Ukraine in NATO?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, I took it the other way around, NATO in Ukraine.
Robert R. Reilly:
Because Ukraine cannot survive.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Yeah, but that was not true before the war started. Why do we want to have NATO in Ukraine? What is the point of it? Why do we want to upset the balance of power in Europe? What was the goal?
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, the goal as interpreted by the Russians was to fatally weaken Russia.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Right, maybe that was the goal.
Robert R. Reilly:
But now Russia is left in the situation with the prospective membership of Finland and Sweden [in NATO]. Unlike the Baltic states, which are so weak they do not present any threat to Russia, the Finns take their self-defense seriously, and there is just some, you know, 800-mile border with Russia, so Russia ends up [in a much weaker position] should they be [admitted into NATO]. I mean, obviously, Turkey is the major problem child in the accession of those two countries into NATO, but when they get in, Russia will have produced the exact opposite of what their objective was.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, yeah, but look, first of all, there is no consensus in NATO regarding fighting the Russians. The Hungarians do not want to, the Turks do not want to.
Robert R. Reilly:
And they have 28 other countries who are fine with it.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I would not say they are fine with it. I think they have kept their heads down, but I am not sure whether they are really so much in favor of getting involved in a general war, whether that is something they want, so I do not think if there was a real vote in NATO, whether it would be possible to get the consensus. You know, Article 5 of NATO is the key collective defense part of the NATO agreement, but it requires a hundred percent consensus. [That is] not going to happen.
Robert R. Reilly:
So as you know, NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg was recently in South Korea, trying to encourage South Korea to supply weapons to Ukraine. They have been supplying humanitarian supplies, but not weapons. He, in his public remarks in Seoul, was saying it is extremely important that Russia not win this war, that the success of Putin’s forces would be bad for Ukraine and [would send] a dangerous message to authoritarian leaders such as President Xi Jinping of China, (I am quoting him), “that they can get what they want through the use of force.”
So is that a convincing message to our Asian allies?
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
No.
Robert R. Reilly:
I mean, they are the ones most directly under threat of Xi Jinping taking Taiwan.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Yes, especially Japan.
Robert R. Reilly:
Yes, indeed.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
But I think it is a different totally different dynamic, different issue, and I do not agree with Stoltenberg. I think he has been too much of a proponent of war when he does not have the membership that supports it. I do not think he is being constructive. There is no chance the Koreans are going to supply weapons to the Ukraine war. They have enough problems taking care of themselves.
The Japanese are not going to do it. They have enough problems of their own and they are worried that the U.S. is, by throwing everything it has into the Ukraine war, leaving them, you know, without any fighting capability, so they are not happy.
Robert R. Reilly:
At a time in which the United States is facing its major threat, its major opponent, from China, which has developed a very serious military, and we now are diverted in terms of our supplies by this war in Ukraine, I would think that that cannot help but weaken our posture in Asia just at the moment when we need to strengthen that posture.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, yeah, exactly. I mean, have you noticed that items, including tanks for Taiwan, have been delayed for a number of years? The F-16s for Taiwan have been delayed for a number of years. The HIMARS for Taiwan has been delayed for a long time. I mean, we cannot supply it.
Robert R. Reilly:
An American [Air Force] general, [Michael A. Minihan], recently made a statement, saying troops get ready because this war is going to take place within two years.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, that is his opinion. I do not have an opinion about that, actually, because I do not know.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, you and a group of retired American generals and admirals published quite a study, assessing the situation between China and Taiwan, and how to protect Taiwan from a successful invasion by China.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
That is correct.
Robert R. Reilly:
I know that is something you have spent a lot of time on.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
[I spent] a lot of time with a group of generals and admirals who served in the Pacific and who know the place intimately well. We are under prepared for Asia, and we are getting weaker in Asia, and the Ukraine war is contributing to that in serious ways, which is another reason why, you know, I asked the question, why do we need NATO in Ukraine? Why do we not try to figure out a solution, a political solution? I think the Russians would settle for some absolute guarantees of no NATO in Ukraine. They would give a lot for that.Robert R. Reilly:
Well, plus keeping the territories that they have gained.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I am not even sure of that. Well, some of them, Crimea for sure, but the rest of it is less certain in my mind.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, they have now said those areas in the east are now parts of Russia and will be forever.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Now they are supposed to be recognized. People can change their opinions if the price is right, if the deal is right, if the arrangements are right. There can be transitional period. I mean, there are all kinds of possible ways to finesse it. The real issue is what is the most important thing to the Russians, right, and to me the most important thing to the Russians is that Ukraine is not NATO territory, that is the important thing to them. That they agree on. You know, the rest of it is politics, in my opinion.
Robert R. Reilly:
We did a Westminster show late last year with an extraordinarily bright young lady who said almost all wars end in negotiation, and negotiations are not yet taking place as far as we know, though they did take place over getting the Ukrainian grain out of the Black Sea, so that we were not facing mass starvation in Africa and other parts of the world. I wonder what would tip this into a negotiation phase. One side or the other would have to suffer serious reverses that they would think are not recoverable and that therefore it is time to end this thing.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Yeah, but that is the worst time to negotiate.
Robert R. Reilly:
Exactly, so that, in a way, is an incentive to keep fighting.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
You know, [during] the Israeli-Egyptian war, the Yom Kippur War, the Israelis had trapped the Egyptian Third Army, and then Kissinger moved in and pushed to everybody, including the Russians, to work in a deal, first a disengagement and then you beyond that.
I do not know that we have that kind of luxury in this situation because it could break the wrong way, the Russians could start to really win and move rapidly, and at that point it may be hopeless, and then they will dictate the terms, so that is why I do not quite understand. I do not know what intelligence assessments the president is getting, but I was listening to Milley, and what he was saying is not optimistic whatsoever. And what I would hope is that Milley would take himself over to the White House and say, you know, you guys [had] better sort this out, let us lower the temperature, let us open the door to conversation with the Russians.
I said in another context, you know, the best guy to do it, by the way, the best guy to actually carry out the negotiations on the U.S. side is probably Milley because he is a respected military guy. The Russians would respect him. They would treat him with respect. He knows how to treat them with respect. He has had conversations with Gerasimov, so it is not something he has not done already. What they have actually said, I do not know, but he does not have a mandate from the White House or the State Department.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, certainly the Biden Administration has put itself in a difficult position by portraying the war in the terms that they have, authoritarianism versus democracy that has world, global significance in this conflict. If it then could step back and accept certain Russian gains in order to end the war, it seems politically the administration would first have to find itself in the situation where support for the Ukraine war and the more than $100 billion dollars committed in support of that war so far, that the American public begins questioning these kinds of expenditures and that the support for the war in Ukraine erodes. It has already declined to a certain extent, but it still [has] majority support.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, I do not know if that is how you do it, but I mean, Trump is now saying he could settle this war and that he considers the Biden [administration] reckless [for] not doing so. He has a big following, a huge following.
Robert R. Reilly:
I believe he said before the start of the war, probably sometime before the war, that he told Zelenskyy, look, just make the best deal you can.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I would not be surprised if that is the case.
Robert R. Reilly:
Back then [it] would not have been such a bad deal.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, like I said before, the Minsk agreements were not a bad deal for Ukraine, necessarily. There would have been a lot more people alive today if we had implemented them, and I think it could have been done.
I do not think Putin was looking for a war. He was looking for a solution. That is still possible. I think the real question is what would move the White House to decide that they ought to at least open the door to some conversations, instead of treating Russians like criminals and ostracizing Russia at every turn and in every possible way, because that is not how you get in negotiation.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, I do not think it is simply Ukrainian propaganda that the Russians in certain instances in Ukraine have behaved like criminals.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
There are war crimes on both sides.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, I am not sure.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I am. I am pretty sure, but that is not the issue.
Robert R. Reilly:
No, it is not. It makes it harder.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
Well, anytime you have this kind of brutality, it makes it harder, it makes it difficult for anyone to make any concessions, but I think we have a national interest here, that we have to protect our national interests. We have to keep ourselves strong in the Pacific. We have to keep NATO together. We do not want it to spin out of control if things go south, so I think we have reason to want to have some conversations with the Russians. It may not work.
Robert R. Reilly:
Well, I am afraid we are out of time right now, and the topic which we addressed today is: The Russia Ukraine Conflict: Is There a Way Out? The answer seems to be we do not know yet.
Dr. Stephen Bryen:
I think that is as fair as you can be at this point.
Robert R. Reilly:
I want to thank Dr. Stephen Bryen from the Center for Security Policy for joining us today to discuss this very important topic and bringing his wealth of experience and perspective to it. I invite our viewers to go to the Westminster Institute webpage or YouTube channel to see the other programs we have done with Dr. Stephen Bryen, the other programs we have done on Russia Ukraine, including, by the way, with General Ben Hodges whom I mentioned earlier, and programs on China, Taiwan, Japan, the general strategic picture in Asia, and other subjects as well, including what the sources of inflation are, and a few other subjects that seem off our regular beaten path. But thank you for joining us today. We hope you enjoy this program and join us again. I am Robert Reilly.